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Toward a More Comprehensive
Theory of Food Labels
Julie A. Caswell and Daniel I. Padberg
Food labels play important third-party roles in the food marketing system through their
impact on product design, advertising, consumer confidence in food quality, and
consumer education on diet and health. However, current analysis focuses
overwhelmingly on the label's direct use as a point-of-purchase shopping aid, even
though such use is limited by consumers' information processing abilities and time. In
rewriting label regulations, policy makers should consider the benefits and costs of the

broad array of roles labels serve, with evaluation of alternative regimes based on their
impacts on consumer behavior and seller strategy.
Key words: consumer information, firm strategy, food labels.

A consensus emerged in the early 1990s on the
need for a general overhaul of labeling require-

with a framework for weighing the benefits and
costs of alternative regulatory regimes.

ments for food products (see, e.g., U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 1990a,
1990b; National Academy of Sciences 1990,
Labeling as Consumer Information
1991). The central argument of the present ar-

ticle is that, in rewriting label regulations, policy makers should consider the benefits and costs The pending update of food labeling regulations
of several important roles that labels play be- will be based on the striking consensus that has
yond their direct use as a consumer shopping emerged in recent years on dietary recommenaid. These nonuse and third-party roles place in- dations aimed at controlling diet-related disease

creased emphasis on label design by explicitly (U.S. Department of Health and Human Serrecognizing a label's impact on product design, vices 1988, National Academy of Sciences 1989).
advertising, consumer confidence in food qual- However, disagreement exists over the degree
ity, and consumer education on diet and health. and manner in which food labeling should atA broadening of the conceptual framework for tempt to foster adoption of recommended dianalyzing food labeling is particularly timely etary practices. Even less consensus exists on
whether labels should be used to transmit in-

since federal legislation passed in November 1990
requires that new Food and Drug Administration formation on issues such as microbial food safety,

(FDA) regulations on nutritional labeling and pesticide residues, use of irradiation, and agrihealth claims be in place during 1992. We pur- cultural practices (e.g., use of biotechnologysue this broadening by analyzing the role of in- based inputs such as bovine somatotropin).
What current discussions have in common is

formation, particularly labeling, in consumer
goods markets and the scope of and justifica- an overwhelming focus on seeing the label pritions for current food labeling regulations. We marily, or even exclusively, as an item of direct
then discuss the limits of food labels as point- consumer information (see, e.g., National
of-purchase shopping aids and the important third- Academy of Sciences 1991). As such, labels are

party roles of food labels. The article concludes a part of the information set used by consumers
in making product selections. This information
set also includes prior experience; media adverJulie A. Caswell is an associate professor, Department of Resource
tising;
word-of-mouth information; and general
Economics, University of Massachusetts; Daniel I. Padberg is a
professor, Department of Agricultural Economics, Texas A & M
dietary education programs carried out by gov-

University.
The authors wish to acknowledge the helpful comments of three
anonymous reviewers.

Review coordinated by Steve Buccola.

ernment, health professionals, or private groups.

Consumer products have been usefully categorized as search, experience, or credence goods
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forquality
ready-to-eat
cereals.' However, the unfoldbased on the timing and types of
inforprocess requires
that consumers have a great
mation available to consumersing(Nelson;
Darby
deal of
information and
and Karni). For search goods, the
consumer
canmake specific assump-

tions,
that they
know claims are being made,
accurately ascertain the product's
quality
before

that the claims
will can
be truthful, and that any
purchase. The quality of experience
goods

product
making
the claim must be of low
only be judged after purchase and
use.not
With
crequality.
dence goods, quality cannot be accurately
judged
Federal
regulators
have been
even after purchase and use and,
thus,
must
be reluctant to rely
on free
market
mechanisms to provide contaken on faith. For food products,
this
categorsumers
with
adequate and
ization is even more useful when
it is
applied
toaccurate label inforon food products.
Federal law (e.g., the
attributes of goods rather than mation
the goods
themselves (Zellner). Thus a tomatoFair
has
search
(e.g.,Act of 19662) prePackaging
and Labeling
sumesand
that search
economies will be gained by
color), experience (e.g., taste),
credence

providing consumers with information in stan(e.g., levels of micronutrients) attributes.
dard formats,
which an unregulated market is
Information in the form of labels,
advertising,

likely
to accomplish.
In addition, federal
word-of-mouth information, not
and
general
edu-

sets ex ante information stancation programs can contribute regulation
to the often
complete-

dards in order
to limit the size of the enforceness and accuracy of a consumer's
assessment

in detecting
and prosecuting deceptive
of all three types of attributes. ment
The job
central
regclaims.
ulatory issue regarding consumer
information is
Federal
regulations
require labels to convey
the degree to which private markets
provide
full
and accurate information to consumers
information on (Beals,
both objective and subjective food

product characteristics.3
Craswell, and Salop; Zellner). Many
food mar-They mandate numerous affirmative disclosures of objective characteristics such as weight or volume, ingrediperfect competition. In these markets, there are

kets do not conform well to the conditions of

ents, and name of manufacturer or distributor.
technically complex products; nutritional and food
They also dictate the location and size of many
safety attributes are not detectable by the senses
or are obscured by significant processing or ininformation pieces on the label. Other types of
objective information have been required under
gredient combinations; advertising is important
in establishing and maintaining product value;
certain circumstances, for example, nutrition laand convenience, packaging, and style are imbeling where any nutritional claim is made.4 They
have also, from time to time, regulated use of
portant to the product's quality image. These are
particular terms such as "low sodium." Health
typically markets in which quality information
claims were in effect prohibited prior to 1984
is asymmetric and in which competition among
(Hutt), but were widely allowed throughout the
sellers is expressed in use of advertising and new
late 1980s. Beyond affirmative disclosure reproduct introductions rather than in price rivalry

(Connor et al., chapters 3 and 5).

quirements, the FDA also enforces a broad neg-

lation. Grossman models such a case where it

bels to differentiate its products must be done

ative mandate that food labels must not be false
Under certain circumstances, private markets,
or misleading in any particular.
regardless of market imperfections, may proA manufacturer's strategic use of product lavide reasonably full information without regu-

is assumed that manufacturers can make ex post
within the confines of federal label regulations.
verifiable claims, that they never lie, andThese
that regulations form a playing field upon which

consumers know manufacturers will make the

manufacturers maneuver for position vis-a-vis
their competitors (Caswell and Johnson). From
most favorable claims possible for their prod-

ucts, short of lying. Manufacturers who can make

a quality claim will do so and consumers will
1 In the case of fiber claims for ready-to-eat cereals, manufacassume that any firm not making a claim has

turers are presumably constrained from lying by FDA regulation of
low quality. Thus consumers can ascertain
falsealabel claims.

product's attributes before purchase by simply
2 As this law applies to food products, see 21 CFR Part 1.
3 The federal regulatory system for food labels is complex, with
examining the producer's claims. This "unfoldthe U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) having authority over
ing process" is attractive, since it places the
meat and poultry products and FDA regulating most other products.
fewest constraints on manufacturers' practices
A detailed description of this system is not central to the arguments
presented
while still providing full, accurate information.

here. The interested reader is referred to Kushner et al.

and National Academy of Sciences (1990).

And some support for it is offered by Ippolito
4 Federal

and Mathios' recent work on fiber content claims

legislation passed in 1990 will make nutritional labeling
mandatory for most food products.
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the manufacturer'soffered
viewpoint,
limited
reg
by the typical store
on complex nutri-

tion is desirable for tion,
maximum
flexibility
taste, convenience,
and price criteria inbut
a

much freedom can be detrimental if it allows
numerous false claims that undermine the cred-

ibility of manufacturers' communications.

limited period of time. Research on grocery
shopping behavior indicates that decision-mak-

ing quality deteriorates when the shopper is un-

Here we focus on the subset of labeling reg-der time pressure (Park, Iyer, and Smith). Third,
ulations that is largely aimed at changing (im-other survey data suggest that consumers dislike
proving) American diets. The subset includesgrocery shopping (American Demographics).
regulation of nutrition labeling, health claims,These factors limit many consumers' use of laand warning labels. To this point, labeling hasbels as shopping aids.
been treated as direct consumer information, with Food labels' impact on purchase decisions is
the federal government intervening in the two- also circumscribed because labels are only one
party relationship between seller and buyer toelement, and not the most prominent or easy to
remedy information imperfections and failures. use one, in a broader set of consumer product
Our purpose, however, is to see food labelinginformation. Advertising is another major source
policy in a broader context. We proceed by dis- of such information. Eight of the nation's twelve
cussing the limits of labels as direct shoppinglargest advertisers in 1990 were major sellers of
aids and by focusing on the additional third-partyfood products (Advertising Age). The largest spent
roles that labels play. The latter roles have im-over $5.6 million per day influencing consumer
pacts on the food marketing system even with- choice, while the smallest spent almost $2 milout widespread consumer use of labels in mak-lion per day. It is estimated that a third of food

ing product selections. Some of these impactsadvertising spending now carries some kind of
occur because a small but active consumer seg-health claim (Hilts). In these markets, the seller
ment uses labels (Padberg), but others can occur influences the buyer and is also often large

even if consumers do not use labels as shopping enough to influence the market as a whole. This

aids.

The Limits of Labels as Direct Shopping

Aids

is clearly a "second best" situation, where government labeling regulation to make the market
conform more narrowly to the perfect informa-

tion ideal may or may not yield welfare im-

provements.
Consumers also receive diet and health guideAs shopping aids, food labels add to consumers'
lines from the medical professions, government,

information base and help guide buying deci-and health and consumer advocacy groups. The
sions. They may make markets work more efnews media prominently reports these guide-

ficiently as competition among firms, in an im-lines and recent research results. However, some
diet and health information is at a level of techproved information environment, awards success
to products with the best (most preferred) attrinical complexity that is generally inaccessible to
butes. The label becomes an instrument of conconsumers. As the controversy over oat bran ilsumer sovereignty. Modem behavior and marlustrates, conflicting information may reach the
from diverse sources.
ket conditions bring stress and distortion to consumer
this
idealized picture (Food Marketing Institute). The
In this context, it is not enough to see labels
consumer is often harried and hurried, and grosimply as direct consumer information. This is
cery shopping logistics limit the potentialnot
forto detract from food labels' recognized value

significant use of label information in making
as such, particularly to consumers (e.g., allergy
purchase decisions.
sufferers, those on special diets, the health-conLimits on consumers' information processing
scious) who frequently use labels for purchase
decisions. Nor is it to lament a loss of consumer
abilities in the supermarket stem from several
related sources. First, periodic surveys bysovereignty.
the
Many consumer products have
Point-of-Purchase Advertising Institute indicate
complex technical properties. To avoid overthat consumers make as many as two-thirds
of consumers choose not to be fully "inload,

final purchase decisions in-store (Food Institute
formed" on all their purchases. The point is that
Report). Second, the average consumer makes
the use of labels to effect changes in the Amerone major shopping trip per week, spending about
ican diet faces limits when the mechanism by

an hour in the store (Meloy, McLaughlin,which
and this change is to be realized is conKramer; American Demographics). Thus the
sumers' direct use of labels as shopping aids. A
broader view indicates, however, that there are
consumer evaluates the over 15,000 products
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additional mechanisms, namely
the
third-party
companies
reformulated
their products to exroles of labels, for pursuing
this
goal.
clude
use of
palm oil and lard. This influence
can occur even in the absence of widespread
consumer label use in making purchase deci(Putler and Frazao). All that is required is
Third-Party Roles of Food sions
Labels
that a population segment or its consumer advocates
read
labels and use
or publicize what
In the broader approach, labels
are
designed
for
they find.marketing systheir impact on the whole food
Label disclosure's informainfluence on product detem rather than simply as consumer
sign is difference.
explicitly recognized The
by many advocates
tion. An example illustrates the
of increased
label information.
A case in point
Center for Science in the Public
Interest
(CSPI)
is California's
Proposition
which estabrecently proposed a food label
reform
that 65,5
comlishes a duty to warn
consumers
prior to expobines a revamped nutrition information
panel
with
sure
to certain carcinogens
and reproductive
a system of stoplights (red,
yellow,
and green)
toxins (Phipps, Allen, and Caswell). Analysts
on the product's principal display panel
who question such warnings argue that they are
(Schmidt). The stoplights would give consumers a quick summary of whether the producta very cumbersome and ineffective way to in-

has a desirable profile of fat, sodium, and fiber form consumers about potentially risky products
content. Suppose the label reformer adopted the or ingredients (Viscusi). They view the warnstoplight system without the supplementary nu-ings primarily as a shopping aid and find them
trition information panel. Such a system might deficient in this role.
Proposition 65's proponents argue that the
serve well the goal of improving the label's usefulness as a shopping aid, since it provides easy- initiative's success will not rest on the effecto-understand information. But the stoplights'tiveness of point-of-purchase product warnings
very summary nature would limit their impact as shopping aids. Rather, they anticipate that
on manufacturers' incentives to produce health- manufacturers will reformulate products to
ier products. This approach would be compa- eliminate ingredients requiring warnings or stop
rable to changing the federal government's au-marketing products with such ingredients (Roe,
tomobile mileage rating system from exact milesRoberts). Thus Proposition 65 could be a suc-

per gallon to "less than 20," "20 to 40," and cess without a single label warning ever ap"40 and over." The competitive reaction wouldpearing (Wall Street Journal). Opponents fobe around the change between categories rather cusing on the warning as shopping aid may
than throughout the entire range (Beals, Cras-entirely miss this point.
Conscious use of labeling to influence prodwell, and Salop).
Label reform should relate to the broad array uct design requires an awareness of food comof purposes labels serve rather than exclusivelypanies' marketing strategies. Such an approach
to their consumer point-of-purchase informationmight be to develop a scoring system that forole. These additional third-party roles are as acuses on a limited number of important catesignificant product-design influence, an adver-gories such as "heart healthy," "variety," and
tising franchise, a public surveillance assurance, "weight control." Within each category, a coma public values definition, and a nutrition andparative scoring system could be developed that

food safety education format. We discuss theseawards high scores for product attributes that

roles beginning with those we believe to be key. conform to accepted nutritional guidelines. Some

attributes (e.g., fat composition) might be ele-

A Significant Product Design Influence

ments of more than one category.

As an example, consider the rating system
shown in table 1. The "heart healthy" category
Once established, labeling regulations signifi-is subdivided into three dimensions: amount of

cantly influence product formulation and refor- fat, kind of fat, and sodium level. Scores for
mulation. Food processors may design a product each of these dimensions are then weighted to

to use a defined label term, such as "low sodium," or reformulate a product to give better

5 California's Proposition 65 led to passage of the Safe Drinking
Water and Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986. In enforcing this act,
using particular in- California initially adopted FDA standards for carcinogens and reproductive toxins in food, drugs, cosmetics, and medical devices.
have to be listed on Therefore, the law has not yet been applied directly to food label-

numbers in an important label category, such as

fiber. They may also avoid
gredients so they will not

the label. For example, many cookie and cracker

ing.

464

May

1992

Amer.

J.

Agr.

Econ.

Table 1. A Rating System for the "Heart Healthy" Attributes of Food Products
Rating score

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Percent of calories from fat 100 95 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10
Ratio of unsaturated to total fat .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 .95 1.0

Sodium, milligrams per serving 700 600 500 450 400 350 300 250 200 150 100

create a composite index. The weighted
use of scores
leverage over consumer choices may be
acceptable
are as follows: amount of fat at 0.45,
typewhen
of it has clear health benefits.
With prodcurrent information, we cannot fully asfat at 0.25, and sodium level at 0.30. The
uct's composite index is
sess the consequences of such a labeling arrangement, although an assessment framework
HEART HEALTHY
is described below. If the system could yield
improvements in the American diet, its devel= (Amount of Fat Score)(0.45)
opment would appear to be worthwhile. It might
+ (Type of Fat Score)(0.25)
+ (Sodium Score)(0.30) also induce advertising information to be set more
firmly in the context of accepted nutritional
In line with consensus nutrition guidelines,
foods(see below). These would be powguidelines
with a high level of fat, saturated fat,
and
so- They are worthy of a considerable
erful
results.
dium would have a low index rating. Such
a ratinvestment
in theoretical and empirical research.
ing system encourages manufacturers to,
in effect, "implement the guidelines" or be stuck
The with
scoring approach has serious potential

a bad score. It also places a much smaller
pre- The major drawback is that what is
drawbacks.

mium on informing the entire population,
sinceto health is the whole composition of
important
improved (from a nutritional standpoint)
prod- diet, not the nutritional profile of ina person's
uct offerings may be attained without dividual
most confoods that make up the diet. FDA and
sumers having a detailed knowledge of USDA
how the
are concerned that rating systems ob-

scores are constructed and with only
a small
scure
this fact, miseducating consumers about

number using the scores in making purchase
delinks between
nutrition and health (Lipman

cisions.

1990a, 1990b). Based on these concerns, FDA
The construction by experts of such dimenand USDA have strongly discouraged private
sional ratings involves judgments. For example,nutritional rating or "seal of approval" prothe consensus target level for percentage of calgrams. For example, in 1989-90 the American
ories from fat has been set at 30%, which in the
Heart Association proposed a seal of approval
present index receives a score of only 80. This
for products meeting its guidelines for fats, cho-

score is chosen because foods lower than the ag-lesterol, and sodium. Regulators and others were
gregate target are desirable in order to balance
particularly concerned that some products would
those with a higher percentage of calories fromreceive approval seals because they had better
fat. It is also known that experts would have
profiles than others in their class, even though
liked to set a target lower than 30%, but felt itthe class itself was not particularly healthy. For

to be unrealistic at this time.

example, margarine might merit a seal when
Ippolito and Mathios' research in the cereal
compared to butter but both belong to the class
industry and Putler and Frazao's on fat con-of fats, whose consumption should not be ensumption in the general population suggest thatcouraged. These concerns related to label and
rating system design would have to be resolved
such information could have a powerful impact
on product design. The impact could be en- if more active use is to be made of labels to

hanced by recalibrating the rating systems overinfluence product design.
time to insure steady but continual improvement

in average product offerings. Some may recoil
An Advertising Franchise
from such a system, believing it has overtones
of Big Brother involvement in consumer prodFood labels and media advertising are closely
uct choices. Experience with tobacco-related labeling, advertising, and education programslinked because firms coordinate label and advertising messages to produce a consistent prod(Ippolito and Ippolito) indicates, however, that
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from the
availability of the
label, should the
uct image. However, regulatory
jurisdiction
over

decide
to use it.
The existence
the two message types isconsumer
split,
with
the
FDAvalue
can be
interpreted
a feeling of consumer asand USDA regulating labels
and
the as
Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) surance
regulating
advertisthat someone
is watching over the presentation
of food
products. This surveillance
ing. In many circumstances,
label
regulations
establish parameters for advertising,
signals to consumers in
thateffect
they can have conficreating and limiting the franchise
to supply's
advertise
dence in the food
quality. While perbased on diet and health relationships.
haps difficult to measureFor
exceptexthrough contingentis
valuation
methodology,
label regulations'
ample, nutritional labeling
currently
volunvalue
terms of generating
consumer confitary, except when a product
isinadvertised
or labeled with any nutritional dence
claim
orfood
information.
in the
supply and the reliability of
food labels
is important.
While modest in its reach,
the
policy has a
straightforward and appealing logic. Where

claims are made, the manufacturer must provide
nutritional information in a
standardized
format, for
A Public
Values Definition/Forum
Consensus
allowing consumers to directly
evaluate the claim.

This system provides a credible verification
Regulators' choice of the required information
every advertising and labeling claim is truthful.
on food labels and the format used signals to

mechanism where consumers cannot assume that
Health claims are a second area where FDA

consumers, distributors, and manufacturers which

label policy has had a strong controllingof
influthe product's attributes are key and which
ence over the scope of food advertising.values
Prior make a difference. Any label reform
to 1987 (Hutt), health claims were generally
ilcrystallizes,
for a significant period of time, a
legal, because they triggered the FDA to
setevalof judgments on what is important in the areas
uate the food product under its very stringent
of nutrition and diet-related disease prevention.
drug safety and efficacy standards. Given
Thethis
process of making these judgements serves
stance, few firms ventured to make such as
claims
a forum for building expert consensus (e.g.,
on labels or, consequently, in their advertising.
National Academy of Sciences 1990).
Health-claims advertising exploded afterThe
1987
prominence of this signaling role varies
when FDA relaxed its label-claims regulation.
among food products. Traditionally, labels have
Thus, while advertising is regulated indepenbeen least important and least used on staple
dently by the FTC, the FDA's label regulations
foods. Frozen vegetables, for example, involve

fewer
nutritional issues or concerns than more
play a key role in setting the parameters for
ac-

ceptable claims. Through their link to advertisprocessed and formulated foods. They are not

ing, label regulations affect the entire set of
con- products and most consumers undercomplex
sumer product information. Label reform stand
should
their food group placement, as stressed by
seek to manage this third-party role of food
lanutrition
education. In addition, relatively little
bel regulations in creating an advertising
franadvertising
is involved in the consumer's efforts
chise.
to understand this product. By contrast, highly

processed or formulated foods, such as snacks
or prepared entr6es, are less classifiable by staA Public Surveillance Assurance
ple origin or experience. They are also products
that are most heavily advertised. They represent
the most convenient way to eat and have beConsumers may value the presence of comprecome a large part of the American diet. It is here
hensive labeling independently of the value they
place on labels as a direct shopping aid. Lenathat food labels play a more important signaling
han et al.'s early study of consumer reaction
to particularly for diet-conscious consumers.
role,
Parallels can be drawn to other consumer
the proposed nutritional labeling format fully
products. Label requirements for automobiles and
implemented in 1975 found that many people
contain objective measurements of atliked the label's existence even though theycigarettes
did
not use it. McCullough and Padberg found
a
tributes
seen to be important to the public, such
similar pattern in a study of consumer reaction
as price information and miles per gallon for cars
to unit pricing in supermarkets.
and nicotine and tar for cigarettes (Ippolito and
In resource economists' language, food labels
Ippolito). In revamping food labels, crucial dehave option and existence values separate from
cisions on relative emphasis must be made with
their direct use value. The option value stems
an eye to the signals transmitted to consumers
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This
isroles
label
third-party
growing outreform's
of the information

where consensus must be found before more

dynamics of modem food markets. A required
technical issues, such as use of pie versus
bar
disclosure
may change the attitude of the congraphs, are tackled. The regulator must sumer
make or consumer advocate (even if consumers
this decision knowing that it will have impacts
do not read or understand it) and may change
on label format, product formulation, advertisthe sellers' strategy. We envision the developing, and consumer's image of particular ment
prodand implementation of policy that recogucts.
nizes and exploits all the roles labels play.
A Nutrition and Food Safety Education

Format

At this point, we suggest the development and
empirical testing of a more comprehensive the-

ory of food labeling. This research has immediate application in a benefit/cost framework for

evaluating alternative labeling regulations. The
appropriate approach is to compare the social
been to classify foods into four groups based
benefits and costs of alternative regimes with an
additional focus on distributional issues. Distrilargely on animal or plant origin. Staple foods
are relatively easy for the consumer to placebutional
in
impacts are particularly important in

The traditional nutrition education format has

this system. It works less well for complex
view of recent research suggesting that some deproducts such as formulated or fortified foods,
mographic segments are disproportionately
combination products such as frozen dinners, reached
and
by diet and health information (Ippolito
many snack items. Advertising is heaviestand
forMathios, Putler and Frazao).

these products.
We argue that potential sources of benefits
nutritional and health claim label regulaAs complex foods become a larger part of from
the

American diet, the traditional nutrition education have been too narrowly conceived. The

benefits will be largely manifested in welfare intion format (and definition of nutritional values)

becomes obsolete. The 1975 nutritional label

creases because of improved health status (re-

ductions
format provided the beginning of a definition
of in mortality or morbidity). The theonutritional values independent of animal orretically
plant preferred methodology for valuing such
improvements
is to measure consumer willingorigin. Recent guidelines go much further in
this

for the associated benefits. Alterdirection (National Academy of Sciences ness-to-pay
1989,
native methodologies that value costs of illness,
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
loss of productivity, and other costs of impaired
1988). New label regulations need to recognize

labels' third-party role in reenforcing other health
formsstatus offer useful but less comprehensive

benefit measures (Landefeld and Seskin, RobertsItand Foegeding).
(National Academy of Sciences 1990, 1991).
Benefits valuation for labeling regulations is
will be a tremendous advantage for label format

of nutrition education at the consumer level

diet is only one determinant of health
to be designed with an explicit view toward complex:
use
status, nutritional attributes are but one factor in
in educational programs. Product labels which
fall short of this standard exact a cost in edufood choice, and labels are only one information
source on food products' nutritional attributes.
cational program effectiveness and consumer

Despite these complexities, alternative nutriconfusion. While our argument focuses on nu-

tional and health claim regulatory regimes should
trition education, it applies as well to food safety

be evaluated according to their impact on coneducation. Labels may soon play a larger role

sumers' decisions and firms' incentives to dein informing consumers about potential product

sign and merchandise products with different
risks and proper handling methods. Here, too,
health profiles.
we should expect considerable synergism between labels and other educational programs. In prior studies, costs of labeling regulations
may also have been too narrowly conceived,
primarily as compliance costs. Recent work by
A Proposed Framework for Evaluating French and Neighbors suggests that such compliance costs, while sometimes large, can typiAlternative Labeling Regimes
cally be absorbed in the normal label-change
cycle if the compliance period is sufficiently long.
The existing conceptual approach to food prodNoa empirical estimates are available on the
uct labels evaluates their impact in terms of
broader economic costs society may incur from
role as consumer "point-of-purchase" informaloss of business flexibility, or potential loss of
tion. We argue that food labels have additional
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New Information." J. Public Econ. 25(1984):53-81.

consumer product choice associated with more
Ippolito, Pauline M., and Alan D. Mathios. "Information,
extensive labeling regulation. Comprehensive
Advertising, and Health: A Study of the Cereal Marevaluation of alternative labeling
regimes reket." RAND J. Econ. 21(1990):459-80.

quires quantifying these costs.
Kushner, G. J., R. S. Silverman, S. B. Steinborn, and R.
While we would like to offer better evidence

A. Johnson. A Guide to Federal Food Labeling Re-

on the importance of food labels' third-party quirements. Prepared for the U.S. Department of Health
roles, such evidence is simply not yet available. and Human Services and the U.S. Department of AgThe framework described here offers an ap- riculture. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing

proach for developing that evidence. In the Office,

1990.
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